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ABSTRACT: While investigating the historical perspective of joint  forest management (JFM) 
programme, this paper observes that the resistance movement of forest communities in western 
Midnapore division in West Bengal, which acted as key precursor to JFM programme in India 
through a June 1990 Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF) circular based upon, to a large 
extent, the successful experience of joint management in Arabari hills, under this division, have 
been mobilized by the poor forest communities from long past for their community right on their 
forest resources in connection with the immediate survival needs. The study of existing four-forest 
protection committees (FPCs) of this area also confirms that this immediate survival needs 
generating mainly from non-timber forest products’ (NTFPs) income of FPC members are the key 
element for the sustainability of JFM. 
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In the context of Indian forestry, several strands have gone to make up the present emphasis 
on community involvement in forest protection. Joint Forest Management (JFM) can be seen to 
emerge as the latest in the history of policy changes, as well as one more in a series of attempt to 
create a new relationship between the state and the community in terms of forest management .The 
old custodian forest management system developed were rendered ineffective in 1950’s and 1960’s 
due to various reasons. The major reason being traditional emphasis on production of commercial 
wood and disregard for local need. Against this old custodian forest management system the local 
communities  in  different  parts  of  India  have  mobilized  repeatedly  from long  past  to  protect their 
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resources from manipulation from outside groups. The emergence of new community forest 
management system in west Midnapore division in West Bengal, like some other parts of rural 
India, is grounded historically in tribal and peasant resistance movements.  
The paper is organized as follows: section I presents the historical perspective of the study, 
section II provides a short review of the relevant literature, section III covers the data set and 
findings, and conclusions are contained in section IV. 
 
I. Historical Perspective 
In the pre-colonial period, western Midnapore was covered by dense Jungle tracts (dense 
forest). While patches of forests, particularly along river plains, had been cleared for agriculture, 
much of the area was wild and remote. Western Midnapore, primarily populated by Santal, Bhumij, 
and Mahato tribals, with some low-caste Hindus, included the police stations (Thana) of Garbetta, 
Binpur, Gopiballavpur, Salboni, Sildha and Jhargram. Prior to the colonial era, while this area was 
nominally under Mughal control due to the inaccessibility of the area, little attempt was made to 
extract revenues or exert political authority. Forest-dwelling communities of this area could resist 
incursions into the area. Their superior knowledge of the jungle and their hunting skills made them 
an effective guerrilla force. Some Bhumij communities gained the reputation as CHAURS (robbers), 
from their aggressive raids into the plains. Many local rajas (kings) and zamindars (land-lords) 
preferred to leave them alone and not attempt to extract taxes from them, rather than to enter 
conflicts with jungle people (Poffenberger, 1995). 
Many tribal communities that maintained forest oriented self-sufficient economics were best 
able to obstruct outside political domination. They alternatively protected their political autonomy 
and forest resources. The Santal and Bhumij tribal communities of forest inhabitants practiced 
shifting (swidden) cultivation as well as hunting and gathering forest products1. Much of their diet 
was provided from wild fruits, roots, herbs and the nutritious flowers and fruit pulp of  the Mahua 
(Madhuca) tree, making them less dependent on agriculture. Tribal villagers were also actively 
engaged in trade in firewood, silk, resin, deer and buffalo, horns, wax, honey, bark fabrics, lac, 
medicine and charcoal2.  
Along with the survival needs of the forest communities, cultural values of them also 
retained health, fertility and prosperity of the forest. During the pre-colonial period, and up to the 
present, the belief systems of the forest communities of this area were strongly grounded in the 
worship of nature. Religious festivals are tied to both the agricultural cycle and the flowering and 
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fruiting of the forest trees. The Santal New Year, for example, begins with the blossoming of the sal 
(shorea robusta) tree in March. This links in tribal beliefs3 helped the regeneration of natural forest.  
In 1760, the district of Midnapore was transferred to the East India Company by Mir Qasim, 
making it one of the first districts in India to be brought under British rule4. During the late 
eighteenth century the British sent military expeditions into this area in an attempt to extend their 
authority and extract land revenues. The forest chieftains and tribal communities resisted, 
ambushing British forces and harassing them whenever possible. Local zamindars also resisted the 
imposition of colonial authority, refusing to pay their taxes, organizing their paik militias to resist, 
and falling into arrears on their taxes. In 1798, widespread violent resistance disrupted revenue 
collection activities in the Midnapore area, forcing the Company to restore lands to hereditary chiefs 
that had been put up for sale for failure to pay taxes. 
Through superior force, however, the British did gradually succeed in extending their control 
in the area through the nineteenth century. As this process continued, the British empowered a new 
class of zamindars to control and tax local forest communities, encouraging them to open forest land 
for cultivation. In order to meet their tax obligation, zamindars were anxious to bring in tribal and 
peasant cultivators to clear forest and convert it to agricultural land. The tribal communities of this 
area resisted the imposition of the taxing and conversion system through a series of armed revolts. 
The first, referred to as the Chuar Rebellions,   lasted   from  1767   to  18005.  Tribal   guerrillas   
were  so  effective  that   ‘even   as   late  as 1800, after nearly forty years of British occupation, a 
collector reported that two thirds of Midnapore consisted of jungle, the greater part of which was 
inaccessible’6. Yet gradually the Company succeeded in strengthening its control, despite 
subsequent revolts by forest people, such as the Naik Revolt (1806-16). Under the Permanent 
Settlement Act by 1866, 1369 zamindari estates had been established in Midnapore, and given the 
absolute ownership of agricultural and forest lands as long as they paid government revenues. 
The process of forest clearing for agricultural land conversion had sweeping ecological 
implications, especially for river systems and soil conditions. Removal of forest cover allowed 
torrential monsoon rains to wash away the shallow top soils, leaving an exposed laterite hard pan 
that made farming virtually impossible in many areas. Traditional forest based industries like tusar 
silk, indigo and endi declined dramatically, as did the population density of this area as the forest 
was cleared. 
The pressure on the forest grew further by the 1860s as the growing railway system 
demanded immense quantities of sal logs to provide sleepers for rail bed. Commercial demand for 
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timber accelerated forest cutting, and raised the value of forestlands. Timber merchants rushed in, 
even before the rail lines opened and began leasing or purchasing large tracts from the Midnapore 
Zamindary Company and other zamindars. 
In early 1855, six to seven thousand Santal tribals from, Birbhum, Bankura, Chotonagpur 
and Hazribagh began meeting for organizing resistance in response to their growing 
marginalization. On July 16, 1855 some ten thousand tribals, under the messianic leadership of four 
Santal brothers stood their ground firmly and fought with bows and a kind of battle-axe in a battle 
near Pirpaiti7. The revolt collapsed eventually after half their members were reportedly killed. 
Despite their defeat the HUL Rebellion (as it is known among the Santal) profoundly influenced the 
ideological development of many Santal communities8, and lives on in the songs and oral traditions 
of the tribal people of this area. Throughout the later part of the nineteenth and first  half  of  the  
twentieth century,  many  forest communities on this  area  became increasingly indebted to money 
lenders and tax collectors, causing widespread mortgaging and loss of their agricultural lands. 
Though the alienation of private lands was an important element in the impoverishment of tribal and 
low-caste communities, so too was the loss of cash and kind income from forest-based activities as 
the forests were cleared.  
The forest policy of post-colonial India continued on the colonial path of commercialization 
and reductionism, and with it continued people’s resistance to a denial of their basic needs, both 
through alienation of rights and through ecological degradation (Shiva, 1999). Despite the populist 
government in West Bengal after independence the old custodian system of commercial forestry, 
which disregarded local need also prevailed in western Midnapore. Throughout 1969 and 1970, 
some forest communities in this area were discontented with the Forest Department and its policies 
of providing elites and contractors with low-cost resource exploitation leases. Forests were logged 
of timber trees and bamboo and villagers lost the raw materials they required for their subsistence 
and commercial needs. The Dom tribals in particularly were upset by the high prices and fuel wood 
scarcity experienced by potters, blacksmiths, and other caste groups also increased antagonism 
towards the forest department and those who acted as contractors for them. 
While successful examples of joint forest management were beginning to emerge in Arabari 
Hill in Midnapore district during the early 1970s, throughout the decade they remained isolated 
cases with little effect on routine forest management within the state. Recognizing the success of 
Arabari and a few other villagers where management agreements with forest communities were 
being made, some senior forest officers like Dr. Ajit Kr. Benerjee, began to encourage field staff to 
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pursue similar negotiations in wider areas throughout the southwestern part of the state. By 
formulating agreements that responded to the economic needs of forest communities, new 
incentives were created among villagers, which resulted in the emergence of   effective  controls  on  
forest  exploitation. The  emergence  of  Chingra  Forest    Protection Committee, Chandana Forest 
Protection Committee, Harinakuri Forest Protection Committee are the examples of decentralized 
nature of forest protection group formation in Midnapore district. This early experience 
demonstrated that opening communications with forest communities could effectively reduce 
conflicts between the forest department and forest user groups. Forest officers were able to identify 
terms for effective management partnerships through discussions. In some communities village men 
formed volunteer patrols. People who were found cutting green wood or grazing animals were 
warned by village volunteers. Repeat offenders from the participating villages were fined, and 
outsiders were turned over to forestry field staff.  
The experience of some forest protection committees (FPCs) in this area illustrates the way 
in which village leaders like Mahadev Munda Singh of Chingra FPC, Lokhun Sahu of Chandna FPC 
and Joti Naik of Harinakuri FPC were able to work with field staff and other neighbouring 
communities to identity forest areas for protection and reach agreements, while turning away 
outsider users. It appears that the ability of local communities to take the lead in defining 
management territories was a key to the success of the programme. Although field staff helped 
facilitate this process by encouraging group meetings and authorizing community protection 
activities, frequently successful FPCs took the initiative in organizing themselves and establishing 
operational controls over forest access. Most confrontations came into effect during the first and 
second year of protection after which restriction and right of the protection committees were 
generally recognized by outsiders. 
Despite its early success, these early achievements were limited to small forest tracts of this 
area. The JFM in this area, however, was largely effective among most of the forest communities 
neighbouring the forest when West Bengal Government Orders were issued on 12th July, 1989 to 
formalize the FPC wherein the duties and responsibilities of the FPC members, usufructury, and 
other benefits to which they would  be  entitled  had  been  laid  down. The departmental  appeal to 
tribal communities to  protect  forest resources and its willingness to empower them apparently 
coincided with a growing desire among these communities to take environmental action. It was 
easier for communities to mobilize because the West Bengal programme did not require complex 
registration and budgetary allocations processes for communities to take action, but rather presented 
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communities with a straightforward opportunity (protect the local forest and enjoy the benefits). As 
each community began protection activities, it influenced the behavior of neighbouring villages. 
Without necessary waiting for the forest department to take action, villagers were forced to 
negotiate and discuss management issues and needs with one another (Poffenberger, 1995). It is this 
community based ‘chain reaction’ or catalytic effect that is apparently a driving force behind the 
rapid emergence of localized access controls on state forest lands in southwest Bengal9. As per the 
latest State Forest Report published from Directorate of Forest, Govt. of West Bengal on December 
2001, the total number of FPC in west Midnapore division was 542, the highest in number among 
all divisions in West Bengal. Thus the historical events outlined earlier in this discourse suggest that 
the communities in this area have mobilized repeatedly over long past to protect their resource rights 
from manipulation by outside groups. This study indicates that the emergence of new wider 
community forest management systems with a straightforward opportunity is grounded historically 
in tribal and forest communities resistance movements. In many parts of rural India, pockets of 
disempowered people have organized repeatedly to struggle for their survival as their resource base 
is increasingly captured by local elites, money lenders, tax collectors, and the state. In the past, each 
time the movement was crushed or collapsed, after some time it would reemerge. The people of 
western Midnapore in West Bengal represent a classical case. 
 
 II. Review of studies 
While empirical evidence across the world now confirms that community-based regimes are 
a viable option for the management of local common property resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996;  
Berkes, 1989; Bromley, 1992; Correa, 1999;Lama and Marlene, 2002; Martin, 1992; McCay and 
Acheson, 1987; Naik, 1995; Saxena and Sarni, 1999; Singh, 1994 & 2001 etc.), the theoretical 
literature has developed an understanding of the mechanism which make these regime work.  The 
early research was pessimistic about the possibilities of group management, arguing that individuals 
would not face the full costs of their resource use under such regimes, and would have an incentive 
to over-exploit the resources.  This was the ‘free-rider’ problem and the only way to solve this 
problem, according to their suggestion, was to create private property rights in the resource, or to 
regulate resource use by coercion through the state. This early theoretical tradition was inconsistent 
with the empirical evidence on group management regimes, and it was subsequently pointed out that 
the free-rider problem was a characteristic of the ‘unregulated commons’ or ‘open access’. This was 
distinct from ‘common property’, a regime in which a clearly defined group co-operated to manage 
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a resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975).  It is no longer theoretically disputed that 
individuals can coordinate their actions and participate in collective regimes.         
As better management of common property resources, such as forests, is considered vital for 
poverty alleviation, sustainable development with equity, ecological stability and preserving bio-
diversity, there is a constant search for alternative approaches necessitated by the fact that the usual 
options of state or market mechanism are not advocated due to their inherent inadequacies. There is 
evidence to suggest that privatization of such common property, resources would enhance inequity 
of denying access to underprivileged classes of the community (Karnath, 1996).  But the survival of 
community needs of poor communities need to be recognized on a priority-based as pillars for 
strengthening their community participation (Mukherjee 1995).  Some authors produced general 
lists of conditions, which facilitate successful community based resource management (McKean, 
1992; Wade, 1998; Baland and Platteaee, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Eleven factors are commonly 
identified in this literature as creating conditions which are  more  conducive to  local-level  
management10.  But expectations of  immediate  returns  via wages and incomes from sale of old 
plantation and local consumption need to fill the requirements of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest 
produce and small timbers seemed the most important factors motivating massive local peoples, 
participation for protection and development of forests (Mukherjee, 1995; Naik, 1997; Saxena and 
Sarni 1999). The present process and basis of developing VFPCs/FPCs will need considerable 
strengthening if these have to be developed into robust and confident village institutions. The first 
important step in this direction is of ensuring that FPC members have clear entitlement to all types 
of forest produces from redefined JFM areas for meeting their bonafide requirements, with no 
removal of produce from the area unless it is surplus to local consumption needs. Moreover, the 
present policy of selecting the most degraded land for planting would have to be modified in favour 
of greater emphasis on regeneration and less on planting (Saxena and Sarni, 1999; p.213).  
But long-term gains hardly matter to people who are facing major problems of livelihood-
food security. In depressed areas with higher level of poverty day-to-day existence comes top most 
on their agenda. The most urgent community need under JFM at Arjuni in Midnapore district, West 
Bengal is that of alternative means of livelihood during lean season with agriculture being the 
mainstay in peak season. The Arjuni experience in JFM shows that unless survival needs of food 
and livelihood are met, participation of natural resources management would always remain 
threatened (Mukherjee 1995; p. 3132). This experience goes a long way to show that survival needs 
are of prime importance and can easily destabilize community rights and benefits to resource 
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management. Any JFM which does not recognize the significance of creating strategies for  
sustaining  livelihood -food security - at the local level has  a doubtful  future  (ibid, p.3132). The 
findings of Naik (1997), based  in two case studies in  Gujrat state, can also help identify the factors 
critical in making the JFM successful and if there are controllable, such as market development and 
share of the local people  in  forest  produce,  necessary  steps  may   be  taken  to  suitably change 
the factors in order to enhance the chances of success of  JFM.The present JFM needs to be 
remodeled in terms of livelihood benefits which are immediate and less commercial (Mukherjee, 
1995; p.3132). To this end, the forest policy of Govt. of India, 1998, recognized the need to fulfill 
the requirements of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and small timber of rural and tribal 
people, and emphasized the need to create massive people’s movement for protection and 
development of forest.  
But concerning to the benefit-sharing arrangement between states and forest communities 
and the management of forest polices differ between states within the country. Orissa’s NTFP 
policies are among the most regressive in the country, guided by the principle that all forests and 
forest produces are state property; the NTFPs gatherers access to income from NTFPs are severely 
restricted due to existing policies. The Vana Samrakshan Samiti (VSS) gatherers get only wages for 
collecting the products. Thus even in jointly managed forest lands, the people, who are supposedly 
co-managers, are treated as mere hired labourers whose earnings are based on the minimum wage 
rate and not treated to the value of the products (Rao, 2001; p.261). In JFM, and also in the recent 
NTFP policy in Orissa, no steps have been taken to address the real problem of NTFP’s gatherers. 
The issues affecting the livelihoods of forest dependent poor women and men remain unaddressed, 
and any talk about community participation in management of forests and community rights remain 
meaningless (ibid, p.262). 
The field context in which JFM is implemented brings together two principal players: the 
village community and the forest bureaucracy. Forest bureaucracy, in many cases, enforces rather 
than abdicates its power influencing adversely the relationship between forest communities and 
forest department. Benefit-sharing arrangement in many states have also been specified in advance, 
without asking villagers whether they, in fact, want to harvest their timber, and how they would like 
the proceeds to be distributed. In most states, the committees are simply registered with the forest 
department. Only in five states (Gujrat, Haryana, Rajasthan, Arunachal Pradesh and Karnataka) do 
the VPCs have a legally independent existence as co-operatives registered under the Co-operative 
Society Act at least  formally (Jeffery and Sundar, 1999; p.45). 
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In most cases the forest department also reserves the right to dissolve committees if they 
perform unsatisfactorily, or at least deny them the shares expected (Poffenberger and Singh, 1996; 
p.71, Jeffery and Sunder, 1999; p.45). As happened in the Panchmahals in Gujrat, parallel processes 
exist, refusing to register existing committees, specially if the forests they have been protecting have 
now turned from degraded into good forests (Agarwal and Saigal, 1996; p.7); or attempting to latch 
onto existing committees while simultaneously denying the legitimacy of rules they have been 
framed earlier and which do not fit into state resolutions (Sundar et al., 1996). Moreover, planners, 
policy makers and forest bureaucracy, in many cases, fails to develop appropriate strategies to 
successfully involve the poor (including women) who depend much more on the forest as they have 
little access to alternative source of biomass in community forestry. It has been well documented 
that community-based projects and programmes (specially in India and Nepal) ignore women and 
the poor (Agarwal, 1997; Hildyard et al., 1998; Hobley, 1996; Joekes et al., 1996; Locke, 1999; 
Lama and Buchy, 2002; Sarin, 1998). Gender, class and castes are often overlooked by policy 
makers. Policy makers do not have understanding of individual relations that have constructed 
through gender, class and caste. Men and women form the poorer sections of the society, especially 
of the lower caste, have been excluded or prevented from participating in community forestry 
programme (Hobley, 1990; Lame and Buchy, 2002). Community forestry in Nepal fails to deliver its 
promise and instead disempowers those already marginalized. On the other hand, the local elite, rich 
families, upper caste group and leaders dominate decision-making process and as a result, get more 
benefit. This will in the long run alienate subaltern groups from mainstream development, hence 
threatening sustainable management of forest resources.  
Although some researchers (e.g. Agarwal, 1986) have questioned the belief that foraging and 
fuelwood collection by the rural poor is primarily responsible for the shortages, the findings of these 
studies are ignored by development practitioners. It is commercial demand that have more 
frequently resulted in large-scale forest destruction (Shiva, 1999; Poffenberger 1995, 1996b; Correa, 
1999). Earlier, inspite of govt. regulation, people would use the forests for firewood, manure and 
NTFPs. With the introduction of JFMP, people agree not to use (or to use specified areas) of the 
forest for these purposes, thereby restricting their use of the forest (Correa, 1999). It has been proved 
that community-based forest protection activities resulted in the rapid regeneration of degraded 
natural forests and confirmed the best prospects for sustainable forestry. Natural regrowth led to 
substantial increase in biomass productivity and enhanced availability of a range of important minor 
forest products. The capacity of degraded natural forests to rapidly regenerate and produce fodder, 
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fuel, fibres and other valuable materials appears to have been instrumental in sustaining community 
protection activities (Poffenberger et al., 1995,1996b; Correa, 1999).  
 
III. Data set and findings 
The study is based on secondary data relating to the study entitled  “Role of NTFP in 
sustenance of JFM a case-study”, carried out by the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) west 
Midnapore division under the office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Govt. of West 
Bengal in 2001. The study was conducted in four FPCs of Nayagram block, in Paschim Midnapore 
district. The enter block is very well forested with forest covering about 48 per cent of the total 
geographical area. As per last census, Nayagram block has a total population of 106490 of which 
18.33 per cent is scheduled cast and 40.45 per cent is scheduled tribe. Sabar constitute one of the 
dominant ethnic groups. The main economic activity of the population is agriculture, the income 
from forest sources being the second most important source. 
Almost entire forest was cut down during late `70s and early `80s of the last century mainly 
due to mass illicit felling by the contractors for the commercial needs. Since then, the forest 
resuscitated following the adaptation of joint forest management principles. The predominate 
species of the forest is sal with associates like mohua (madhuca indica), bahera (terminalia balerica), 
piasal (pterocarpus marsupium), asan (terminalia tomentosa), karam (adina cordifolia), pial 
(buchanania lanzan) etc. Most of the tree cops are of coppice origin. The study has conducted in 
following four FPCs:  
Ambisole FPC - This forest protection committee is located in the Nayagram beat of Nayagram 
Range. The committee was registered in the year 1991, it’s registration number being 
392/WM/FPC/224/NG-42. Total forest area under the forest protection committee is 130 hectares. 
There are 41 members in this FPC of which 40 belong to scheduled tribe and one to general caste. 
There are 23 Lodha members in this FPC. All the 40 scheduled tribe members of this FPC are 
landless. 
Bansiasole FPC - This forest protection committee is also located in the Nayagram beat of 
Nayagram Range. The committee was registered in the year 1990, it’s registration number being 
330/WM/FPC/45/NG-17. Total forest area protected by this FPC is 102 hectares. There are 60 
members in this FPC, of which 34 belong to scheduled tribe and the rest 28 to general cast. There 
are 18 Lodha members in this FPC. All the 34 scheduled tribe member of this FPC is landless. 
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Kasia FPC - This forest protection committee is located in Chandabilla beat of Chandabilla Range. 
The committee was registered in the year 1991, it’s registration number being 378/CB/WM. Total 
forest area protected by this FPC is 215.89 hectares. There are 100 members in this FPC, of which 
24 belong to scheduled tribe and the rest to general caste. There are 11 Lodha members in this FPC. 
Fourty-one families are landless.             
Kadokata FPC - This forest protection committee is also located in Chandabilla beat of 
Chandabilla Range. The committee was registered in the year 1995, it’s registration number being 
409/CB/WM. Total forest area protected in this FPC is 343.27 hectares. There are 24 members in 
this FPC. All of them are tribal. The forest protected by this FPCs shows typical characteristic of 
this area. Tree species in the forest were enumerated by laying out sample plots. 
This empirical study might help us know whether the economic returns from forest - the 
share of net revenue from final harvesting of timber, income in the form of wages from forestry 
activities and income from NTFP in the forest - are significant for FPC member for the 
sustainability of JFM. But data in some cases are non-classified and non-tabulated. Despite these 
limitations, we have attempted to study their findings in simple proportions, averages and in some 
tabular forms for this paper. A mathematical model is also framed in the light of our empirical 
results (represents in the appendix).       
As may be seen in table 1, the per capita annual money incomes from the share of revenue 
from timber are dissimilar across four FPCs studied. Since felling intervals are not same for all 
FPCs studied, area of felling coupe is not uniform and per capita forest of FPC members across the 
committees are dissimilar; also per capita notional income of a member per year is not equal. It is 
important to mention that each FPC, according to JFM agreement, becomes eligible to get a share of 
25 per cent of total revenue earned from final harvesting of timber products. It is also observed that 
although per capita annual money income of a member of Ambisole and Kadokata FPCs is higher 
than that of total average. Out of total forestry income of FPCs, the share of revenue of final harvest 
of timber is 1.48 per cent in Ambisole FPC, 0.36 per cent in Bansiasole FPC, 0.22 per cent in Kasia 
FPC and 1 .37 per cent in Kadokata FPC. As the share of revenue from timber is very small source 
of income for all FPC members and this income is received by the FPC members at some irregular 
annual intervals, this income, usually, does not meet up their immediate survival needs. It is 
important to mention that although the success of Arabari experience in JFM in Midnapore district, 
West Bengal is well known, however, ironically, in the same district, JFM of Arjuni mouza which 
started from 1991, failed to deliver results after the middle of 1994 as the members of FPC were 
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only granted to have 25 per cent share of timber, without any other share of the forest resources 
which was insufficient to meet up the immediate survival needs of poor FPC members. It caused for 
large illicit felling, mainly, by the poor forest committees due  to  meeting up their immediate 
seasonal livelihood and food insecurity, which plagued the area and led to conditions of semi-
starvation amongst the poor people.  
In order to meet their immediate survival need, the poor FPC members are exclusively 
engaged as labour in forestry operations carried out in their respective jurisdiction. All such forestry 
operations, such as raising nursery, planting, tending, harvesting, entry point activities are labour 
intensive and serve as small scale of their income, particularly in the lean season (Table 2). Income 
from this source per member per year is computed by adding wage component of total amount spent 
over 5 years (1996-97 to 2000-01) in a particular FPC and dividing it, first, with strength of FPC 
members and then with number of years (five years in this case). This source of income, too, is 
variable across FPCs and depends on the scope of forestry operation in a particular committee area. 
Income as wages from forestry works constitute 4.80 per cent in Ambisole FPC, 5.67 per cent in 
Bansiasole FPC, 2.34 per cent in Kasia FPC and 10.98 per cent in Kadokata FPC out of their total 
income from the forestry sector. Although this source is small, it is one of their sources of survival 
during lean season (June to September). 
In addition to the maintenance of regular consumption needs of the local FPC members, 
NTFP is the main source of money income for all FPC members under our study (Tables 3a, 3b, 3c 
and 3d). Some common characteristics may be discerned in this regard. First, the money income 
generated from the share of revenue from timber and income as wage from forestry works are 
insignificant in relation to NTFPs for all FPCs studied. The contribution of NTFPs’ income of 
Ambisole, Bansiasole, Kasia and Kadokata FPCs are 93.72 per cent, 93.98 per cent, 97.44 per cent 
and 87.65 per cent respectively out of the total money income (from all sources) of the respective 
FPCs.  Secondly, sal leaves (shorea robusta) are the main source of money income of NTFPs for all 
FPC members. More than 35 per cent of total NTFPs’ incomes for all FPC members come from the 
sale of sal leaves to the local market. The period of availability of sal leaves is the highest (10 
months in a year) of all NTFPs. The money income received from other NTFPs are different for 
different FPCs. Thirdly, out of 36 types of NTFPs, 10 types11 are common to all FPCs studied. The 
contribution of these common NTFPs’ income of Ambisole, Bansiasole, Kasia and Kadokata FPCs 
works out to 62.58 per cent, 70.18 per cent, 62.20 per cent and 78.64 per cent respectively out of 
total NTFPs’ income of the respective FPCs. Fourthly, the period of availability for the same NTFP 
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does not differ among FPC members. Moreover, the local rate (Rs. per unit) of the same NTFP does 
not differ among FPC members. The members of each FPC dispose of the same NTFP at a fixed 
price. The amount of output the members of the FPCs decides to sale seems to have no effect on the 
local market of the product. 
This study, however suggests that the relative importance of NTFPs in forest-based 
economics is supreme. Consequently, it plays the major role in sustenance of joint forest 
management and to this end the FPC members are expected to optimize the production from timber 
to NTFPs (discussed in the appendix with a mathematical model). Although, the sample size (four 
FPCs) is too small to make a generalization, it may be said that in predominantly tribal FPCs with a 
good cover of sal forest, NTFPs provide the main source of forestry income. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The historical context in which JFM has emerged as the latest in a history of policy changes 
in India has been grounded since long past by the community resistance movement of local poor 
communities against the old custodian system of forest management. In many parts of India where 
forests are an essential component of the local livelihood support system, a community-based rights 
regime with build-in safeguard for access and the livelihood of forest dependent people have been 
grounded historically and that have provided a solution to problems of sustainable forest 
management as well as sustainable local livelihood maintaining bio-diversity, ecological balance 
and environmental stability. This study also suggests that the present   JFM  model needs to be  
remodeled  in  terms of  livelihood  benefits of the  poor forest communities which are immediate 
and less commercial and in line with this, the new policy management of both degraded and non-
degraded forests are to be re-oriented from timber production to optimizing the production of 
NTFPs for strengthing the livelihood of local communities as well as the sustainability of 
community forest management with environmental stability. Any JFM, which does not recognize 
significance of sustaining livelihood -food security - at the local level, have a doubtful future. 
 
APPENDIX 
MODEL: The solution to optimal resource exploitation problems of community forestry relating to 
the sustainability of JFM system may be studied by the form of present-value Hamiltonian function. 
This form assumes that simple replication of past decision with any other choice (there is none, in 
fact) to be made at some later date. Each decision imposes an externality on the future (Silberberg, 
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1990; p.14-15). The solutions to this problem are termed ‘open-loop control’. They represent once-
and-for-all solutions to dynamic optimization problems, which are as if the firm decides in the 
initial period what to do for all future periods and stick to that plan. The following assumptions are 
taken in this regard.  
Firstly, the growth function of NTFPs is a continuous time-logistic function  
                           v  (t)=g (v (t), u (t), t)   
where v (t) is the stock and u (t) is the rate of harvest. The logistic growth function is widely used in 
empirical analysis (Hanley et al., 1997: chapter 10). The growth of NTFPs may continue for some 
years although ultimately the volume of NTFPs reaches at its peak and then declines as the NTFPs 
decay and eventually die. It has the characteristics that at low stock rate of growth is low, it peaks at 
a particular time and then declines towards zero. 
Secondly, the total income (nominal and /or physical) of NTFPs is shared equally among the 
members of local forest communities involved in JFM program. Government does not take any 
share of income from NTFPs.  
Thirdly, the members of FPC in JFM sell the NTFPs in a competitive market at a fixed 
price (discussed in the text). pu is the net revenue function and u is the control variable.  
Finally, both harvesting and planting of non-timber trees are costless. 
JFM committee aims to maximize its profit subject to the stock over an infinite time 
interval. Mathematically the problem is  
                                 Maxu  ∫o
∝
 pu e-rt dt                                                                  (1) 
                    subject to    v  = g (v, u, t),     v (o) = vo                  
where u is the harvest rate at time t (NTFPs are usually harvested every year). v is the stock, pu is 
the net revenue function and g(.) is a logistic growth function. x (o) is the initial stock [Endpoint 
conditions vary. Typically the initial stock is fixed, although the final stock may not be (Silberberg, 
1990; p 618)]. r is the discount rate. The variables v,u and λ all have time subscripts. The growth 
function, g (v, u, t) = av+bv2- u, a > 0; b < 0. 
The necessary conditions can be represented by introducing Hamiltonian function, H (.) 
H (v, u, λ, t) = pue- rt  + λg (v, u, t) 
       
This function is equal to the profit plus the change in the stock valued by its shadow price. 
The Hamiltonian allows a convenient representation of the necessary conditions which compromise 
the maximum priciple: first differentiation H(.) with respect to u and setting equal to zero. 
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        δ H  =  pe- rt  + λ gu   = 0                                                                  (2) 
        δ u                                          
where the Hamiltonian is maximised with respect to u, and the costate condition is  
                              δ H  =  λ  = - λ gv                                                                            (3) 
                              δ u                                             
The costate variable is not of direct interest, so (2) and (3) are used to eliminate it. In the 
same series of manipulations, the time variable is also eliminated so that results can be expressed 
independently of time.  
First writing (2) explicitly for the logistic growth function  
                            pe- rt  - λ  = 0                                                                                 (4)  
and note that this implies that harvest continues until the marginal profit (here average profit) equal 
the marginal value of stock, λ. 
Differentiating (4) with respect to time  
                            λ = -r pe- rt                                                                                    (5) 
When the specific functional form (logistic growth function) is included, (3) can be written as  
                λ = - λ (a + 2bv)                                                                          (6)                         
The procedure now is to eliminate the costate variable and define a steady-state solution. 
To this end, equate (5) with the (6) and eliminate λ using (4) to define a steady-state equilibrium 
                             r = a +2bv = gv                                                                           (7)   
where own rate of return on the stock (gv) is equal to the discount rate (r). 
The term gv is of great importance: it indicates how the rate of stock growth changes with 
respect to the stock and it, therefore, represents the return on relating the marginal unit of stock. 
Thus gv is the own rate of return on the stock. 
The system of differential equations is complete by the growth equation  
                         v  = g(u,v) = av + bv² - u                                                           (8) 
This is the required result, it represents the problem as two autonomous differential 
equations (7) and (8) which are independent of time. Although there is no guarantee that these 
equations can be solved analytically, they allow us to assess the optimal harvest rate of NTFPs given 
initial conditions (v0, u0) and a steady-state solution which may be viewed as the comparative static 
solution to the dynamic problem where the stock and the harvest rate are constant and no incentives 
exist to adjust them, to the problem (The equilibrium solution in an imperfect market is identical to 
that of the competitive problem [7] ). 
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The necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to (1) can be achieved by checking 
that second order derivative of the maximized Hamiltonian with respect to v is non-positive 
       δ
2
 H   = λ 2b 
        δv2 
As λ ≥ 0; that is, shadow price of stock is non-negative and b<0, the condition for concavity 
is satisfied and a solution which satisfies the maximum principle conditions is both necessary and 
sufficient (Hanley et al., 1997; p.200). 
If we, however, relax the last assumption and introduce cost function (cost per unit 
harvesting is declining function of the stock), the problem becomes 
                              Maxu  ∫o
∝
 (pu - c(v)q)e-rt dt 
                  subject to v = g (v,u,t),        x(o) = xo                                 
  and the result after manipulation will be                                 
             g/v) =  c/ (v) g(v)    =  r              
                                      
  
( p - c (v))                                                                    (9)                            
From (9) the rate of return on holding the marginal unit of stock can be decomposed into two 
parts: the return from increased stock growth, g/(v) and the return from reduce cost. This implies 
that the optimum level of stock is less in the presence of costs than would be case for zero costs.  
 
 
 
   
Notes: 
1)  See Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas, p. 28.  
2) For detailed information, see L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetter: Bankura (Calcutta 1911),           
W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal: vol- III (London, 1876). 
3) The links in tribal belief between the health of the forest, fertility and prosperity are clear in the following 
lines from this Baha festival song.  
When the sal trees are in leaf, 
On the mountain, 
How lovely they look, 
Wealth in the house…. 
See W.G. Archer, The Hill of Flutes, Love and Poetry in Tribal India: A Portrait of the Santals (London, 
1974), p.237, for and extensive discussion. 
4) See S.Dasgupta, Adivasi Policies in Midnapore  
5) The British adopted the Bengali term ‘chaur’ meaning an outlandish or wild person, to refer to the tribal 
and low-caste people of the area. 
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6) For detailed information, see Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas, p. 35. 
7) See Dutta (Calcutta, 1940) the Santal Insurrection of 1855-1857, p. 26. 
8) For discussion, see Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas, p. 35. 
9) It is likely that similar community concerns over environmental degradation in other parts of India could 
provide effective support for joint management programmes if initiated by state forest departments. 
10)  The common factors are (i) perceived benefits from co-operating; (ii) clearly defined rights and boundaries 
for resources; (iii) knowledge about the state of the resources; (iv) small size of the user group; (v) low 
degree of heterogeneity of the user group; (vi) long-term, multi-layered interaction among the community; 
(vii) simple rules and adaptable management regimes; (viii) graduated sanctions as punishment; (ix) ease 
of monitoring, and accountability; (x) conflict resolution mechanisms and the role of leadership; (xi) 
influences from the wider political economy. 
11) The common NTFPs are sal leaves, pial fruit, mohua fruit, mohua flower, kurchi fruit, haritaki fruit, dudhi 
lata, kurkura mushroom, karan mushroom, ghora insect. 
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Table 1: Income from the share of revenue from timber from 1995-96 to 2000-01  
Share of revenue for the entire FPC (Rs.) Name of 
FPC 
No. of 
members 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 
Income/ 
member/ 
year (Rs.) 
Ambisole 41 0 13373 0 79734 0 0 378 (1.48) 
Bansiasole 60 0 15338 0 0 0 11984 76 (0.36) 
Kasia 100 0 0 0 0 48084 0 80 (0.22) 
Kadokata 24 0 0 0 0 0 80985 562 (1.37) 
Total 225 0 28711 0 79734 48084 92969 185 (0.59) 
 Figures within brackets represent percentages in respect of income from timber out of total forestry income. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Income as wage from forestry-works from 1996-97 to 2000-01  
Name of FPC No. of members Amount spent in the FPC in 
this five years(Rs.) 
Income/member/year 
(Rs.) 
Ambisole 41 251629.33 1227.64 (4.80) 
Bansiasole 60 355459.40 1184.86 (5.67) 
Kasia 100 432531.18 865.06 (2.34) 
Kadokata 24 539749.97 4497.91 (10.98) 
Total 225 1579369.88 1403.88 (4.53) 
Figures within brackets represent percentages in respect of income as wage from forestry work out 
of total forestry income. 
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Table 3a: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs 
                      of Ambisole FPC. 
 
NTFPs 
Period of 
collection Local rate (Rs.) 
Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 2000 nos. 8400 
 (35.04) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days  
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 1 kg 420 
 (1.75) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) 
30 days 
 (Apr - May) 
8 per 90 kg 720 
 (3.00) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 2.5 kg 900 
 (3.76) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days  (Mar 
- Apr) 
3 per kg 5 kg 450 
 (1.88) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days  
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 1 kg 660  
(2.76) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 3 kg 450  
(1.88) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 400 nos. 480 
 (2.01) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 4 kg 1200  
(5.00) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 1 kg 600  
(2.50) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.3 kg 1170 
 (4.88) 
Rahara (Soymida 
febrifuja) fruit 
20 days  (May 
- June) 
6 per hundred 300 nos. 360  
(1.50) 
Sidha (Lagerstroemia 
parviflora) fruit 
15 days 3 per kg 2 kg 90  
(0.38) 
Anantamul 
(Hemidesmus 
indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 2 kg 600  
(2.50) 
Satamul (Asperagus 
racemosus) 
15 days 6 per kg 2 kg 180  
(0.75) 
Chun alu ( Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 2 kg 1440  
(6.01) 
Kalmegh 15 days 7 per kg 6 kg 630 
 (2.63) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720 
 (3.00 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 2.5 kg 2700  
(11.26) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.5 kg 1800 
 (7.51) 
Total    23970* 
 (100) 
        Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
       *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Ambisole FPC members works out to 93.72 out of their forestry 
income. 
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Table 3b: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from of 
NTFPs Bansiasole FPC. 
 
NTFPs 
Period of 
collection Local rate (Rs.) 
Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 2000 nos. 8400 
 (42.67) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days  
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 0.5 kg 210 
 (1.07) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) 
30 days 
 (Apr - May) 
8 per 30 kg 240 
 (1.22) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 0.5 kg 180 
 (0.91) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days  (Mar 
- Apr) 
3 per kg 10 kg 900 
 (4.57) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days  
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 1 kg 660  
(3.35) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 2 kg 300  
(1.53) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 500 nos. 600 
 (3.05) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 3.5 kg 1050  
(5.34) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 2 kg 1200  
(6.09) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.25 kg 975 
 (4.95) 
Ban karala (Urea 
lobata) 
30 days   25 per kg 0.1 kg 75  
(0.38) 
Anantamul 
(Hemidesmus 
indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 1 kg 300  
(1.52) 
Satamul (Asperagus 
racemosus) 
15 days 6 per kg 3 kg 270  
(1.37) 
Chun alu ( Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720  
(3.66) 
Kalmegh 15 days 7 per kg 5 kg 525 
 (2.67) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 0.5 kg 360 
 (1.83) 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 1.5 kg 1620  
(8.23) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.25 kg 900 
 (4.57) 
Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days 
May 
20 per kg 10 kg 200 
(1.02) 
Total    19685* 
 (100) 
        Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
       *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Bansiasole FPC members works out to 93.98 out of their 
forestry income. 
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Table 3c: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from NTFPs  
of Kasia FPC. 
 
NTFPs 
Period of 
collection Local rate (Rs.) 
Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 3500 nos. 14700 
(40.89) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days 
(Apr - May) 
20 per kg. 2.5 kg 1050 
(2.92) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) fruit 
30 days (Apr- 
May) 
8 per kg 120 kg 960 
(2.67) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per 3 kg 1080 
(3.00) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days 
(Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 2 kg 1320 
(3.67) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 2 kg 300 
(0.83) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 150 nos. 180 
(0.50) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 2 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 2 kg 1200 
(3.34) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.25 kg 975 
(2.71) 
Bhurru (Gardenia 
gummifera) fruit 
20 days 4 per kg 5kg 400 
(1.11) 
Atari (Combretum 
decundrum) fruit 
15 days 2 per kg 20 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Anantamul (Hemi-
desmus indicus) 
15 days 20 per kg 2 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) gum 
120 days 10 per kg 1 kg 1200 
(3.34) 
Chun alu (Dioscorea 
deltoidea) 
120 days 6 per kg 1.5 kg 1080 
(3.05) 
Bahera gum 120 days 10 per kg 2 kg 2400 
(6.67) 
Paan alu 120 days 6 per kg 1 kg 720 
(2.07) 
Kanta alu (Dioscorea 
pentaphylla) 
120 days 9 per kg 2 kg 2160 
(6.01) 
Sal resin 60 days 60 per kg 0.25 kg 900 
(2.50) 
Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days (May) 20 per kg 20 kg 400 
(1.11) 
Pog mushroom 60 days (July-
Aug) 
8 per kg 1.5 kg 720 
(2.00) 
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Jara kalai (Glycine 
hispida) 
75 days (June-
Aug) 
30 per kg 80 kg 2400 
(6.67) 
Total    35945* 
(100) 
         Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
*The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Kasia FPC members works out to 97.44 out of their forestry 
income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3d: Period of collection, sale value, collection intensity and annual per capita income from 
NTFPs of Kadokata FPC. 
 
NTFPs 
Period of 
collection Local rate (Rs.) 
Average daily 
collection (per 
member) 
Average annual 
income per 
member (Rs.) 
Sal (Shorea robusta) 
leaves 
10 months 14 per thousand 5000 nos. 21000 
(58.48) 
Pial (Buchanania 
lanzan) fruit 
21 days (Apr- 
May) 
20 per kg 5 kg 2100 
(5.85) 
Mohua (Madhuca 
indica) fruit 
30 days (Apr- 
May) 
8 per kg 40 kg 320 
(0.89) 
Mohua flower 45 days 8 per kg 2 kg 720 
(2.01) 
Kurchi (Holarrhena 
antidysenterica) fruit 
30 days 
 (Feb - Mar) 
22 per kg 0.5 kg 330 
(0.92) 
Haritaki (Terminalia 
chebula) fruit 
15 days 10 per kg 3.5 kg 525 
(1.46) 
Dudhi lata 
(Oxystelma esculata) 
30 days 4 per hundred 50 nos. 60 
(0.17) 
Kurkura (Lycoperdon 
sp) mushroom 
30 days  (June 
- July) 
10 per kg 5 kg 1500 
(4.18) 
Karam mushroom 30 days 20 per kg 1.5 kg 900 
(2.51) 
Ghora insect 30 days 130 per kg 0.2 kg 780 
(2.17) 
Bahera (Terminalia 
balerica) fruit 
30 days (Mar-
Apr) 
3 per kg 3.5kg 315 
(0.88) 
Atari (Combretum 
decundrum) jhanti 
60 days 10 per basket 0.5 pon. 3000 
(8.35) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) fruit 
30 days 2 per kg 10 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Asan (Terminalia 
tomentosa) gum 
120 days 10 per kg 0.5 kg 600 
(1.67) 
Bahera gum 120 days 10 per kg 1.5 kg 1800 
(5.01) 
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Ban kundri (Coccinia 
indica) 
15 days (May) 20 per kg 20 kg 400 
(1.11) 
Pog mushroom 60 days (July-
Aug) 
8 per kg 2 kg 960 
(2.67) 
Total    35910* 
(100) 
       Figures within brackets represent percentages of income out of total income from NTFPs. 
 *The percentage of NTFPs’ income for Kadokata FPC members works out to 87.65 out of their 
forestry income. 
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